Myth #5: The Mind ≈ Computer Myth

In their day, new technologies --from the camera obscura through moving pictures to the Web itself-- provided compelling metaphors for the human mind. Memory, experience and learning have, for example, been likened to the exposure of a photographic plate (Draaisma, 2000), the "cinematographic" capturing of motion (Bergson, 1998), and the construction of associative "links" between nodes of information (e.g., Chen & McGrath, 2003). Each metaphor seems to have been equally compelling and convincing in its time. E-learning research is currently in the thrall of at least two of these explanatory metaphors: One is the information theory model, which has served as a kind of "Rosetta stone" in theories of communication (Yacci, 2000; p. 2), especially those in distance education. The second is the complimentary "mind as computer" metaphor, which stands as "the fundamental tenet of cognitive science" (Bruer, 2003; p. 160). The first of these metaphors finds expression in discussions of the roles of sender and receiver in distance educational "transactions" (e.g. Garrison and Shale, 1990) and "interactions" between content, student and teacher (Moore, 1989; Anderson, Annand & Wark, 2005). The second is encapsulated, for example, in descriptions of ICTs as "cognitive technologies" (Pea, 1985; Greening, 1998), "cognitive tools" (Lajoie, 2000) or "mindtools" (Jonassen, et al, 1999) --as instruments that form a "partnership" with the learner to "share" "extend" and "amplify" her cognition (Jonassen, 2000).

The problem is that these metaphors are not neutral. In the context of distance education and e-learning generally, they just happen to coincide with the specific technologies that are at the centre of each field. In other words, the idea that we produce, receive and process data like computers gives data and computation two conspicuous roles in these disciplines: (1) They provide a way of understanding dynamics of thought, learning and communication; but (2) they are also the means of choice for supporting, revealing, mirroring, or modeling these phenomena. The result is a self-reinforcing, tautological circularity: "To be effective, a tool for learning must closely parallel the learning process; and the computer, as an information processor, could hardly be better suited for this" (Kozma, 1987; 22). In this case, the metaphoric or heuristic character of "mind as computer" is forgotten, and the computer appears, deus ex machina, as a singularly cognitive technology. As Feenberg puts it, "having conceived of thinking as a kind of [computational] machinery, [this] machinery in fact turns out to be the perfect image of thought" (Feenberg, 2002; 97). Similarly, having conceived of communication and interaction as data transmission, reception and feedback, the corresponding technologies, too, become natural extensions for communication and interaction. The result is that qualitative differences between modes of communication and interactivity are minimized or erased. Whether at a distance or face-to-face, between humans or with computers, communicative and interactive forms become directly comparable or even subjected to an "equivalency theorem" or a "media equation" (Anderson, 2003; Anderson, Annand & Wark, 2005; Reeves & Nass, 1996). For example, we read about the Internet being "a channel for information about the world, no more or no less than any other channel" received by the brain (Downes, 2003). As Downes says, "[a]ll experience is, to a degree, mediated, [for example] though the waves of light and sound." Adding a computer and a network to the mix would accordingly be a change in degree, rather than a qualitative or categorical transformation.

Seeing thought and communication as in this way effectively "technologizes" these human activities, making the integration of advanced technologies into these processes seem like a foregone conclusion.

These metaphors also play out a pattern that has been repeated many times over the past centuries. Scholarship in the history of psychology explains this historical pattern in terms of the "tools to theories heuristic:" A process in which tools and their pragmatic uses are "projected into the mind" to explain otherwise invisible and enigmatic mental phenomena (Gigerenzer, 2002; 39-40).

Is speaking of the mind in terms of processing and data really different from what happened 100 years ago, when the French philosopher Henri Bergson was describing mental life as essentially "cinematographic"? At roughly the same time in history, Thomas Edison (inventor and tireless promoter of cinematic technology) was similarly arguing for the superiority of "instruction through the eye," predicting that "books will soon be obsolete in the schools. Our school system will be completely changed in ten years" (as quoted in Jaffee, 2003). Having conceived of the cinema as the metaphor for the mind, it becomes much easier to see movies as overtaking the role of books, and utterly changing the face of education. Is e-learning in danger of falling prey to the same complicity or conflict of interest illustrated by Edison?

What to do: Awareness of such historical patterns and contingencies, and of the figurative nature of mental and communicative metaphors, is a good first step. Naturally, we cannot escape from the limits of our historical situation or move completely beyond metaphor and heuristics. But we can consider the use of other metaphors which are less complicit with other emphases of our fields, ones that do not so blatantly "technologize" phenomena like human communication and learning. This involves the recognition that technical and natural scientific language and explanation are only one of many possible modes of explanation, and not always the most appropriate ones. Modes of explanation in learning are likely to be different than those, for example, in physics. For example, accounting for the words on this page in terms of photons and wavelengths, would not be helpful in editing it or debating its contents. As examples of forms of explanation or metaphors that could be used as alternatives, "communication as transmission" could be replaced by "communication as social action." This could be done through reference to "speech act theory" (Austin, 1962), or "conversational analysis" (Hutchby 2000) both of which highlight how we continuously "generate…commitments, through [both] speaking and listening" (Winograd & Flores, 1986). In the place of "mind as computer" and "thought as computation" one could consider possibilities provided by the constructivist notion of "thought as dialogue" (e.g., Salgado & Hermans, 2005) –as a conversation with a concrete or "generalized other" (Mead, 1934) which underscores the essentially social- and action-orientation of mental life. Recent developments in psychology and sociology, generally speaking, provide a wealth of paradigms and metaphors that escape the tautological confines of technological metaphor.

References:

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Anderson, T. Annand, T. & Wark, N. (2005). The search for learning community in learner paced distance education: Or, 'Having your cake and eating it, too!' Australasian Journal of Educational Technology 2005, 21(2), 222-241.

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